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Summary 
 
Historians and political Science follow different tracks in South 
Asian Studies. Barring a few, historians tend to stop in 1947 and 
political scientists tend to pick up the story from this point onwards, 
albeit concentrating largely on the events of just the last twenty 
years. This predominance of political scientists in analyzing Indian 
politics has reinforced the myth that politics in India is riddled with 
paradoxes. Thus the constitutional commitment to individualism is 
apparently constantly contradicted by the communitarian ethos of 
politics, the official policy of secularism is compromised by 
repeated occurrences of communal violence, and the emphasis on a 
universal adult franchise is undermined by the persistence of 
political dynasties. The top-heavy state, the politics of identities, the 
etiolating institutional capacity of the state to govern, and the 
degenerated condition of class politics are often used as critical 
templates by which to measure political dynamics in India. National 
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security is a key term often referenced, but poorly defined, in such 
theoretical constructions of the Indian polity.  
 
This paper claims that a dialogue between historians and political 
scientists can provide for a far better comprehension of Indian 
politics than is offered by these functionalist templates. Rather than 
viewing Indian society and politics through ready-made theoretical 
lenses, the paper argues for a more expansive, temporal view of the 
articulation of different forms of political practice in India. It argues 
that a temporal analysis can instead establish that the apparent 
paradoxes of Indian politics are no more than the expression of 
long-standing dialectical and dialogical process of engagement by 
different actors in political society. These articulate complex but 
integrated patterns of political transaction that are by no means 
contradictory but have become established and clearly recognized 
by political actors over time. 
 
Introduction 
 
On 15 August 1947, at the moment of the birth of Indian republic, 
Premier Jawaharlal Nehru hyperbolically announced to the nation 
that India’s dark past was over and India’s assignation with nation 
making had begun. Interestingly, Nehru’s brilliant metaphor became 
a reality for scholars studying India. Barring a few exceptions, 
historians often stop in 1947, indicating the end of a ‘history’ i.e. 
India’s past. Political Scientists only commences their analyses in 
1947 as if a line had been drawn in the flow of time indicating the 
beginning of ‘modern’ India. This division of labour has been a 
convenient shorthand with which to hammer into shape the 
complicated flow of events, however the work of political scientists 
examining events post 1947 has not been without flaws. 
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Underlying the academic division of labour in 1947 there is a 
theoretical assumption common among historians that politics in 
post-colonial India was somehow radically different from that of the 
late colonial era. Post-colonial India was a sovereign democratic 
republic operating under a citizen’s constitution. Under the 
provisions of this constitution the state regularly held elections in 
order to provide opportunities for its citizens to determine the 
succession of governments. This is perceived to be a quantitative 
leap forward from the paternalistic despotic structure of the colonial 
state.  
 
While there is no doubt that the assumption of a qualitative 
difference in the nature of pre and post-independence governments 
is partially true, it is also evident that the first generation of post-
colonial India’s politicians were products of the late colonial era. 
India witnessed the rise of mass politics after the First World War. 
Many politicians who held high positions in the Government of 
India after independence learnt their craft in the inter-War era. 
Political parties also matured their tactics of mass mobilisation 
during the high tides of the nationalist movement. Even many 
aspects of the constitutional edifice of the post-colonial polity were 
established in the late colonial period.  
 
For the study of India post 1947, historians complain about 
methodological problems the lack of access to archives that 
constitute the primary materials of the historian’s crafts. This is due 
to the fact that after 1955 most government departments gave up the 
practice of regularly wedding and transferring records after a lapse 
of 20 or 30 years to state and national archives so that they might be 
available for public access (in itself an interesting departure from 
British colonial practice).  All government records after 1955 are 
therefore a part of current departmental repositories, to which 
normally only government officers have access. This includes even 
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reports on the debates of state legislative assemblies. The 
collections of private papers held at the Nehru Memorial Library in 
New Delhi offer one of the few opportunities to methodically and 
systematically chart the workings of government and society, yet 
outside Teen Murti there are few repositories in which a complete 
run of regional newspapers are available. Yet historians can import 
methodologies from various social science disciplines to reconstruct 
a temporal framework approach for the post independence period. 
More importantly, the Indian polity was and is embedded within 
wider societal structures characterised by divisions along lines of 
caste, class region, religion, and gender. These social fault lines 
came to inform politics in a significant way over a period of nearly 
a century. Thus the state-society relationship that constitutes the 
critical bedrock of politics cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
longer temporal framework of social and economic transformations 
in India. Unfortunately, excepting a few, historians have tended to 
surrender the field and have failed to engage in a dialogue with 
political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists that might make 
a thoroughly historicised understanding of post-independence 
developments possible. 
 
It terms of methodology, political scientists have displayed a far 
more nuanced and interdisciplinary approach. Many have borrowed 
field survey techniques from anthropology that have enabled them 
to develop a more penetrating analysis of contemporary affairs. 
However, political scientists approach Indian politics with 
readymade theoretical frameworks that were often grounded in 
more euro-centric notions of democracy and nation formation. Thus 
soon after Independence when political scientists looked at the 
complex ethno-social mosaic of Indian society they developed deep 
doubts about the possible survival of the new nation state. In Europe 
and North America, nation-states had identifiable commonalities in 
terms of language and ethnicity, but in India these were 
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spectacularly absent.   It was long held that democratic forms of 
governance are integrally related to the prosperity of industrialised 
societies. Yet India remained industrially under-developed and 
poverty endemic for many decades after independence. Scholars 
were often surprised by the growth of democracy, let alone its 
continuation, in such a poor nation. The sensational titles of many 
popular and even some academic publications on India, predicting 
catastrophe for the new nation, starkly reveal the widespread 
influence of this prejudice. 
 
Confounded by the complexity of the Indian situation and 
influenced the functionalist theory of modernisation dominant in 
American academe, many pioneering political scientists, such as 
Myron Weiner, Morris W Jones and Lloyd I Rudolph and Susan 
Rudolph chose to look at Indian politics through the prism of 
culture. Within cultural contexts they reworked the notions of 
tradition and modernisation in a complex fashion. These pioneering 
analysts thus sought to understand how a democratic state can 
withstand the pressures of a transitional ‘primordial society’, which 
was characterised by a complex ethno-religious mosaic and 
emerging modern interest groups. Others, such as Rajni Kothari and 
Kochanek used the same functionalist templates to understand the 
party political system and the links between the party political 
system and interest groups. Their initial focus was thus directed 
towards the Congress Party of India’s preeminent political apparatus 
of governance.  
 
With the decline of Congress party’s political hegemony from the 
1970s onwards, many scholars looked at the operation of factions to 
understand India’s political dynamics. A giant figure among them 
was Paul Brass, who in his 1965 study Factional Politics in an 
Indian State proffered possibly one of the very best analyses of the 
operation of factions in a North Indian polity. Finally, as India 
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progressed into seemingly endless political crises and supposedly 
spasmodic economic development, scholars turned their attention to 
the restricted capabilities of the state to deliver development and 
how the pressure from societal interest groups paralysed India’s 
economic development. Borrowing from Samuel P. Huntington’s 
Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), and The Crisis of 
Democracy: On the Governability of Democracies (1976), Atul 
Kohli explored the idea of India having an overloaded state within a 
hyper mobilised society. Finally, with the demise of the dirigiste 
economy and the simultaneous rise of liberalisation, political 
scientists and political sociologists such as Rob Jenkins turned their 
attention to behavioural characteristics of actors within the corridors 
of power and the workings of institutions1. Finally scholars such as 
Ashutosh Varshney brought society to the centre stage of politics 
and relocated the state’s capacity to prevent riots within the context 
of societal relationships between rival ethno-religious groups.   
 
No doubt such approaches generated powerful insights that have 
helped us to better understand Indian politics. We selected these few 
scholars not because of their ideological predilections, but because 
their towering presence in many ways have substantially informed 
our understanding of Indian politics.  Nonetheless, with a few 
exceptions such as Varshney, these highly sophisticated and 
nuanced analyses, in general, ignored the resistance of subaltern 
groups and tended to view social movements as merely contributing 
to the complex problem of hyper politicisation within Indian 
society. Complex developments within the local politics were 
reduced simply to the operation of patron client relationships and 
political brokerage. Even Marxists such Sudipto Kaviraj and Achin 
Vanaik preferred to view politics through the lens of passive 
revolution or used terms such as ‘degenerated working class 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999.	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parties’, thereby reducing the agency of popular movements and 
parties and imposing their own theoretical preferences onto their 
complex and seemingly unruly subject matter.  
 
An alternative approach suggested here is that a dialogue between 
historians and political scientists can provide a far better 
comprehension of Indian politics than is offered by the functionalist 
templates that have been widely employed hitherto by Indian 
scholars. Rather than viewing Indian society and politics through 
ready-made theoretical lenses, a case can be made instead for a 
more expansive, temporal view of the articulation of different forms 
of political practice in India. From this perspective it may be argued 
that that the apparent paradoxes of Indian politics are no more than 
the expression of long-standing dialectical and dialogical process of 
engagement by different actors in political society. These articulate 
complex but integrated patterns of political transaction that are by 
no means contradictory but have become established and clearly 
recognised by political actors over time, in many cases beginning 
even in preceding centuries and continuing up to the present day. 
 
I 
 
Tradition and the Modern in the Making of Political Culture 
 
The most popular reworked version of tradition and modernity 
surfaced in the writings of Myron Weiner who was possibly one of 
the most formidable intellectual influences studying South Asia in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Weiner’s first monograph, 
published in 1957, analysed opposition politics in India2. The study 
was based on detailed personal interviews with numerous 
opposition politicians, primarily from Left and Centre-Left parties. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.  
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But his theoretical considerations were rooted in an assumption that 
education was eroding earlier sources of social status based on caste 
or tribal loyalties, and that politics had became the new source of 
power. But political parties in India represented not simply political 
ideologies but also factions and personal loyalties to leaders. In a 
powerful monograph in 1962 Myron Weiner studied Indian politics 
through an examination of West Bengal politics3. His study of 
politics in West Bengal was deeply influenced by the approaches of 
functionalism and offered an input-output analysis of the political 
system. He was associated with Gabriel Almond and his colleagues 
on the Committee on Comparative Politics of the American Social 
Science Research Council who dominated the study of comparative 
politics in the United States in the 1960s. Weiner wrote a classic 
text on how pressure groups sought to engage in bargaining with the 
state. He promoted the view that there were two kinds of interest 
groups: one based on modern associational politics such as trade 
unions, student movements, peasant associations and thus were 
characterised by modern political rhetoric, whilst the other was that 
of tribes, castes, and organisational associations of the locality. He 
that thought both kinds of group were authentic and legitimate 
representatives of democratic aspirations and that there should be an 
accommodation of their interests.  
 
Soon after publishing The Politics of Scarcity, Weiner wrote a 
powerful essay introducing the concepts of elite culture and mass 
culture to the study of Indian politics4. Both these cultures Weiner 
argued were permeated by a modernising ethos and traditional 
cultural values. For Weiner, mass political culture represented 
society’s attitudes towards governance at a local and state level 
where local politicians operated within the ambience of caste, tribe, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India, 1962. 
4 Myron Weiner “India’s Two Political Cultures” in Myron Weiner (ed.), Political Change in South 
Asia, Calcutta: Firma K L Mukhopadhaya, 1963 pp. 112-140.  
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ethnicity and language. He argued that elite political culture could 
be located within the national capital, generated the discourse of 
development in the English language, and plugged into globally 
dominant paradigms of development. Weiner claimed that these two 
cultures would be likely to clash as elite developmental culture 
operates within a utopian vision of development spawned by the 
governing elites whilst mass political culture was demanding power 
and patronage for ethnic groups and tribes. Thus he feared that the 
governing elite would be likely to impose authoritarian regime as 
their failure to control mass culture became evident. In other words, 
Indian politics was viewed through the prism of modernity and 
tradition but in a more sophisticated and nuanced manner than 
before. But whilst Weiner tended to seek these groups as being 
motivated in completely opposite directions, it could be argued that 
historically such multiple interests groups and contradictory 
articulations of politics were merely a part of the usual rhetoric of 
bargaining and resistance exercised by political entrepreneurs 
arising from amongst the subaltern classes. These were neither new 
nor diametrically opposite but were dialectically related to the logic 
of domination and hegemony.   
 
The most important contribution in Weiner’s work lay in his 
understanding of the functioning of the Congress Party of India. To 
understand the operation of the Congress Party, he studied politics 
in five states in two cities (Calcutta in West Bengal and Madurai in 
Tamil Nadu) and three rural-urban contexts (Belgaum in Karnataka, 
Khaira in Gujarat, and Guntur in Andhra Pradesh). His methods 
were anthropological, using detailed in-depth interviews. Weiner 
conducted this research for eighteen months in 1961-62. Based on 
this detailed field research he maintained that the success of the 
Congress within competitive party political structure could be 
located in the way the party managed different interest groups at 
district level. He believed that districts had their unique social 
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mosaics and cultural loyalties that could not transcend their 
geographical boundaries. Thus Congress’s success lay in the 
successful management of caste, tribes and linguistic pressure 
groups within districts. This sums up his understanding of Indian 
society as an aggregation of localised interest groups locked within 
their castes and linguistic identities, articulated by local political 
actors within the framework of the Congress Party machine. 
Congress was thus a supra local alliance of political actors operating 
at grass roots level.  This view obviously discounts ideologies and 
the abilities of local actors to make independent cross-district 
alliances. Politics was merely an aggregate of interest groups 
confined to their caste, language and regional identities representing 
mass political culture, which were in dialogue with elite political 
culture focused on development and nation building. 
 
This understanding of India in terms of diverse and contrasting 
political cultures received a further clarification W. H. Morris-
Jones’s work on government and politics in India published in 
19645. Morris-Jones expounded the idea that there were three 
languages of politics in India: the modern westernised language in 
which politicians talked about constitutions, law courts and 
administration, the traditional language in which caste or jati as it is 
understood in rural India plays a dominant role, and the saintly 
language adopted by many a politicians to prompt Indian people to 
demand better moral conduct from their governing elites. Morris-
Jones claimed that the contrasting pulls of traditional culture and 
modern culture often created conflicts of loyalty among politicians. 
Village sub-castes argued Morris-Jones thus play a critical role in 
shaping politics in India.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 W. H Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India, London: Hutchinson University 
Library, 1964.  
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It was not long before Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph in The 
Modernity of Tradition (1984) challenged the misplaced polarities 
between modernity and tradition in Indian society so fondly 
espoused by earlier functional theorists. They argued that modernity 
and traditions are inextricably interrelated in ways that are 
significant to modernisation. They applied this thesis to the 
development of caste associations, the traditional roots of Gandhi’s 
charisma, and the functioning of British law courts and legal 
traditions in the country. They argued that caste functions as a para-
community in India whereby the mass media and transportation 
system reinforce caste consciousness. This transformed caste 
associations into collective entities through which people are 
mobilised into parliamentary democratic politics.  Similarly, they 
presented Gandhi as a moderniser who selectively used Indian 
traditions to initiate the process of modernisation. Finally, they 
demonstrated how British judicial courts reinforced Brahminical 
law and thus combined elements of both British and Brahminical 
legal practices. They thereby effectively demonstrated that tradition 
and modernity are not antipodes of each other but are intertwined in 
terms of their impact on Indian politics. The book, a collection of 
three essays, thus undermined the possibility of any simplistic 
reading of tradition versus modernity in understanding Indian 
politics.  
 
Despite the sophistication of the Rudolph’s reinterpretation of the 
dialogue between tradition and modernisation, the theme of 
modernisation under the British and Indian parliamentary system 
remained central to the writings of a majority of political scientists. 
For example, nearly quarter of a century after Independence, writing 
in 1970 in Asian Survey, an influential political scientist, Robert 
Hardgrave, brilliantly posited these seeming contradictions in 
explaining the Marxist movement in Kerala: 
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Kerala is a land of contradiction in a nation of 
contrasts. It is miniature of India with all its varieties 
pushed to the extreme. …It has the highest literacy rate 
and the highest rate of unemployment. With the largest 
community of Christians, it has the Communists vote 
also. It is once a bastion of orthodox Hinduism, with 
the most elaborate caste ranking in India and a region 
deeply affected by social mobilization and change. 
With many of the “prerequisites” of political 
modernization, Kerala is regarded by the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist) - or CPM - as an advanced 
outpost of revolutionary struggle6. 
 
The operative word here is modernisation. Interestingly instead of 
viewing these contrasts as the product of a societal arrangement 
where domination and resistance constituted critical components of 
the same societal structure, even a scholar like Hardgrave 
juxtaposed them as contrasting examples of tradition and modernity. 
Even while engaging with history, Hardgrave in his illuminating 
study of the Nadar ‘community’ in Tamil Nadu spoke of its 
transition from being a disjointed low caste ritually poor social 
group into a well organised community under the impact of 
modernising forces of Christianity and colonial rule, which then 
again fragmented into social groups divided along class lines under 
the impact of post colonial democracy7. The unifying theme of his 
entire thesis was the impact of forces of modernisation on 
community formation. Hardgrave thus subjected his materials to a 
theoretical straight jacket and almost avoids entirely the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Marxist Dilemma in Kerala: Administration and/or Struggle, by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 
Asian Survey, 1970, University of California Press. 
 
7 The Nadars of Tamilnad: The Political Culture of a Community in Change (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1969) 
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fundamental question of what constitutes a community. Can we 
really call Nadars a community? Or is it possible that various 
locally disjointed oppressive group merely self-mobilised by using 
this template in order to secure their interests? The Nadar 
community was possibly a rhetorical construct rather than a 
practical socio-political entity.  
 
Using an approach similar to Hardgrave, Markus Franda in an 
important study, ignored the growth of communist politics in 
Bengal as a manifestation of the elite assertion of regional identity 
and posited instead a theory of the acculturation of the Bengali 
bhadralok under Western impact as the reason for their infatuation 
with Marxism8.  Studying culture became another cryptic shorthand 
for the reassertion of the thesis of modernisation albeit in a more 
historically nuanced manner.  Again Franda simplified his rich 
empirical data in order to subject it to his theoretical straight jacket. 
If he had not done so, he might have recognized that Marxism in 
Bengal had not only an impact on the high caste bhadralok but was 
still more popular with rural, ritually low caste communities who 
produced some of the most effective peasant leaders of the CPI (M) 
such Harekrishna Konar.  No doubt Hardgrave and Franda provided 
us with rich examples of the dialogue between history and politics, 
as well as locating politics within the ambit of wider state society 
relationships, but their continued regard for modernisation theory 
leads to the pruning of rich details of historical reality for the sake 
of theoretical coherence.  
 
II 
System and Faction 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Marcus Franda Radical Politics in West Bengal, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1971.  
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In 1964 Rajni Kothari condensed his series of articles on the Indian 
party political system published in the journal Economic and 
Political Weekly into a single article on the Congress system 
published in Asian Survey9. He argued here that the Congress Party 
had the ability and willingness to accommodate diverse and 
contradictory interest groups within its fold and at the same time 
could incorporate pressures from opposition leaders. He 
demonstrated that inter party competitions and inner party 
factionalism had a dynamic relationship within the Indian political 
system. Inter Party competitions were thus incorporated within 
inner party factional struggles and these factions in their turn create 
a democratic dialogue within the party for policy making and 
personal political relationships.   In his monograph published in 
1970,10 Rajni Kothari further explained the Congress system as a 
uniquely Indian system, which could be resilient and flexible 
enough to accommodate pressures from diverse groups from 
secessionists to Marxists and could thus create a stable political 
system within the midst of crisis.  While Kothari’s model can be 
applied to explain high politics in the Nehruvian era, it seems such 
assertions ignore the complex realities of Indian politics. Different 
forms of regional social movements and resistance to Congress rule 
not only exposed the vulnerabilities of the Congress Party but also 
led to the death of the Nehru Congress with Mrs. Gandhi forming 
her own Congress (the Requisitionists) in 1969. The new Congress 
was a radically different outfit with very little intention to absorb 
factions and regional leaders. Accommodative politics was over. 
Nonetheless, rather than looking at the Congress as a supra-local 
alliance among different types of local actors operating within 
diverse and segregated localities, Kothari sought to provide us with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Rajni Kothari,  ‘The Congress System…’ Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 12 (Dec., 1964), pp. 1161-
1173 
10 Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1970. 
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a theory of the party-political system in India in its totality which 
simply did not fit the historical facts. 
 
The term ‘one party democracy’ that Kothari coined and used to 
explain the Congress system was again invoked by Stanley 
Kochanek in his study of the Congress Party published in 196811. 
Kochanek studied the relationship between the party Congress 
President and the Prime Ministers, the role of the Congress central 
working committee and such related bodies as the parliamentary 
board and finally the socio-economic background of the Congress 
leadership. Kochanek studied the relationship between the party 
executive and the government executive in terms of three time 
periods: the period of transition (1946-51), the period of 
centralisation and convergence, 1951-63), and the period of 
divergence 1963-67. His basic argument highlights the success of 
the Congress under Nehru, during which period Nehru allowed the 
working committee to operate in a creative manner. The third phase, 
argues Kochanek, was the era of equilibrium between the central 
and state governments. Sadly, however, Kochanek provides us with 
little understanding of the operation of the entire political system of 
the country. It provides intricate details of the party political 
mechanism but not the wider societal impetus and the forces of 
changes that lay outside the party political mechanism and yet 
profoundly influenced the political process. 
 
As the term ‘the Congress system’ gained popularity, ironically the 
very operation of the system was being explained in terms of 
factions and rivalries within the factions. Obviously Kothari used 
factions in terms of inter party and inner party political 
competitions. But a more substantive lead came from Paul Brass. In 
a major study of UP politics published in 1965 Brass argued that in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Stanley Kochanek, The Congress Party of India: the dynamics of one Party Democracy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 
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the absence of external threats, the presence of an internal 
consensus on ideological issues, and the absence of authoritative 
leadership, the UP Congress was composed of factions stretching 
from villages to state level12. Faction leaders exercised a tight 
control over their immediate followers, which often resembles guru-
disciple type relationships of intense quasi-religious devotion. He 
further asserts that in traditional society decisions about factional 
disputes are not resolved through institutional laws but by personal 
arbitration from a reputed neutral leader, who are few and far 
between. In other words factions are immobilising the functioning 
of the decision making process. But factions are also enabling 
Congress Party to recruit new activists as different factions are 
engaged in the process of recruiting new followers. More 
importantly, factions are cutting across caste, class and regional 
boundaries. Paul Brass thus brilliantly introduced a new concept of 
functionalist discourse into the study of Indian politics, namely the 
role of factions. His theoretical apparatus remained the old theory of 
tradition and modernity but it operated with new analytical tool. 
Factions can certainly provide a useful critical tool to help explain 
the rise of social movements or new types of ideological templates 
based on caste, such as that proposed by the Jat leader from U.P., 
Charan Singh. However, the concept of the faction tends to project a 
view of Indian society devoid of ideological clashes or the 
economic and cultural moorings of politics. Despite Paul Brass’ 
brilliant engagement with politics, his original interpretation 
provides us with a largely reductionist view of Indian society. Later 
Brass moved away from factional analysis and concentrated on 
deeper theoretical explanations of regional politics. 
 
III 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Paul Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh. 
Berkeley, CA:  University of California, 1965. 
	   17	  
Political Economy: the State, Dominant Classes and Social 
Movements 
 
With the introduction of emergency rule by Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi in 1975 and the increasing assertions of state power by the 
central government in every aspect of the society, the 1970s saw a 
new focus on the state as a critical political arena in contemporary 
research on India. Scholars concentrated particularly on the analysis 
of the relationship between the state and dominant proprietary 
classes. In 1975 Hamza Alavi, the noted Marxist scholar of South 
Asia, argued that in post-colonial societies where the indigenous 
bourgeoisie was weak, the military-bureaucratic axis that came into 
existence with the emergence of colonial rule would become an 
autonomous power and would subjugate the other ‘exploiting 
classes’ such as the landed classes, indigenous and metropolitan 
bourgeoisie. This thesis of the state as the playground of elite 
interest groups in the Indian context found more coherent shape in 
the neo-Marxist writings of Pranab Bardhan. Bardhan identified 
three dominant proprietary classes: the industrial capitalists, rich 
farmers and professional bureaucratic elites. Competition and 
conflict among these dominant classes influenced the ability of the 
state to act independently. Soon after independence India’s political 
elites enjoyed a substantial degree of autonomy because the 
dominant classes were not very much organised. Increasingly, in the 
post-colonial era these classes became more mobilised and thus 
made demands on resources that were needed for public sector 
investments and long term planning. This led to increasing 
corruption with the state becoming a virtual patronage distribution 
mechanism by means of subsidies and inefficiently managed public 
enterprises of various sorts.  
 
In contrast to Bardhan, Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph in The Pursuit 
of Lakshmi (1987) highlighted the paradox of a weak-strong state 
	   18	  
presiding over a rich-poor economy. The economy is described as 
rich-poor because of the highly developed industrial sector co-
existing with subsistence level agriculture. According to the 
Rudolphs the state was weak-strong because despite having 
substantial bureaucratic personnel, the state was unable to penetrate 
rural society effectively. The rising level of political mobilisation in 
rural society further served to undermine state influence. The 
deinstitutionalization of the Congress party under Mrs. Gandhi, 
growing agrarian conflicts along caste and class lines, and 
increasingly powerful religious nationalist movements in the 1980s 
was the final imposition of clear limits the extent of state control. 
 
Despite its weaknesses, the state, according to Rudolphs is 
nonetheless a critical player in politics. Social engineering initiated 
by the state brought into existence a powerful class whose interests 
are tied to its functioning. While this social class attempts to garner 
resources through the state in the name socialism, ordinary citizens 
form pressure groups that the Rudolphs label ‘demand groups’. 
These demand groups organise street level agitations to achieve 
their goals. They do not seek to organise lobbies, influence 
patronage networks or develop institutional networks to influence 
political power. They cite the campaigns of rich peasants in Uttar 
Pradesh and Maharashtra (a common demand being debt relief13) as 
examples of such one-issue movements. 
 
Both these readings of Indian political economy provide powerful 
insights. Nonetheless, Bardhan’s account of structural conflicts 
marginalises human agency in the unfolding rivalries of class and 
sector. It also ignores critical societal factors such as caste, region, 
or language that influence political decision making processes. His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The state-sponsored consolidation and elimination of rural indebtedness was, interestingly, an idea first 
introduced by the British colonial government in the 1930s, the memory of which, arguably, persists to this 
day. 
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structural approach provides us with a critical analytical apparatus 
to help understand the material bases of political power. But that 
structural analysis needs to be grounded in the historical reality of 
long term processes leading to the formation and dismantling of 
social classes. More importantly, this model needs to incorporate 
resistance from subaltern social groups both at an everyday level 
and in terms of critical policy events. Rudoph’s historically 
contingent model is arguably still more problematic when it comes 
to explaining the complexity of Indian politics. For example, the 
Rudolphs ignore the seminal role that agrarian class conflicts play in 
shaping politics in India. Such conflicts are articulated in diverse 
ways. The street level agitations of rich peasants in Uttar Pradesh 
and Maharashtra thus had a deep impact on the policies of the state. 
They inserted themselves into political patronage networks and 
important politicians such as Charan Singh and Devi Lal built their 
careers in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana on the basis of the articulation 
of these new agrarian interests. These rich peasant groups and their 
leaders transformed themselves into powerful power brokers. They 
very effectively illustrate the manner in which the apparent 
paradoxes and crises of Indian politics are no more than the 
expression of long-standing dialectical and dialogical process of 
engagement by different actors in political society. 
 
Atul Kohli’s influential work on The State and Poverty in India 
(1987) provides us with a nuanced model of the Indian polity. Kohli 
argues that in developing economies propertied classes impose their 
demands on the state through their control over productive 
resources. States that could insulate themselves from the pressures 
of propertied interest groups were more likely to be able to reach 
their developmental goals. The nature of the state’s ability to rule 
crucially hinges upon the regime types that organise political rule. 
In a democratic society, party political configurations constitute 
regimes. According to Kohli, the nature of the leadership, the 
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ideology of the ruling party, and its organisational structure 
critically influence a regime’s ability to implement developmental 
policies for the poor.  By engaging in a comparative study of West 
Bengal under the CPI (M), Uttar Pradesh under the Janata Party, 
and Karnataka under Devraj Urs, he argues that the CPI (M) with its 
pro-poor political ideology, disciplined organisational structure and 
stable leadership was able to penetrate the countryside more 
profoundly. It was therefore far more effectively able to implement 
pro-poor policies such as land reforms, central government financed 
programs for the improvement of the living standard of small 
farmers, and wage and employment schemes for landless workers. 
This was particularly so when their efforts were compared those of 
the faction-ridden, rural elite dominated Janata Party. Though 
Devraj Urs’ Janata government shared with the CPI (M) 
government a pro-poor ideology, it had comparatively a far less 
impressive record in implementing pro-poor policies because of the 
weak organisational structure of the party.  He thus concluded that 
the Left of centre political parties could implement pro-poor 
policies far more effectively than any other.  
 
In a similar fashion, in a following study on the gradual decline in 
the state’s ability to govern and maintain the rule of law entitled 
Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of 
Governability (1991), Kohli directed his investigations at three 
levels: the district, regional state, and nation with a focus on 
leadership. In selecting districts he deliberately followed Myron 
Weiner’s earlier study Party Building in a New Nation and thus 
looked at five districts (Belgaum in Karnataka, Khaira in Gujarat, 
Guntur in Andhra Pradesh, Madurai in Tamil Nadu, and Calcutta in 
West Bengal), he then looked at three states - West Bengal, Bihar 
and Gujarat - and finally looked at the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi in 
terms of his failure to implement policies of liberalisation, 
organisational reform of the ruling party and finally his handling of 
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Punjab crisis. According to Kohli, the systematic intervention by the 
state in the economy and its inclination to influence the process of 
allocation resources led to competition among interest groups to 
influence the decision-making process of the state. The continuous 
erosion of social hierarchy has further increased collective demands 
and pressures upon the government. In response to this situation, 
leaders resorted to populism and mobilised social groups whose 
demands they knew they would not be in a position to satisfy.   This 
populism undermined the long-term credibility and planning of 
political parties.  Again Kohli’s research indicated that CPI (M) in 
West Bengal was far more successful in establishing a party 
organisation that could direct popular pressures into building new 
institutional infrastructures that would enable better governance. 
 
Kohli provided a new analytical focus on the political party and its 
role in managing economics, providing stability in terms of law and 
order, and innovating new policies. Yet Kohli’s highly sophisticated 
and nuanced interpretation of Indian politics ignores how a political 
party develops the capability to deliver such development goals. In 
Bengal the Left movement developed such capabilities through 
participation in popular social movements and by translating this 
social capital into governance after accessing political power. Thus 
it is important to see how political parties as embedded within 
longer term changing social relationships as much as how they are 
produced by ideology and by able leadership. Societal structures 
and human agency interact with each other in reshaping politics. 
Neither of these relationships is static, nor are they divorced from 
one another. State policies alone do not create demand groups. 
Rather developments within society lead to the formation of social 
networks and alliances that seek to influence state policies, and state 
policies then further empowered social groups.  
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So far the literature surveyed focuses on the role played by 
indigenous factors playing in shaping Indian political economy. But 
a crucial study by Francine Frankel, India's Green Revolution 
(1971), demonstrated how developments within Indian political 
economy were influenced by influences from abroad. Francine 
Frankel’s study of high politics in relation to economic policies 
present us with a more nuanced picture of how the gradual 
abandoning of Nehruvian institutional reforms were informed by 
resistance from local elites as well as by international pressures. 
Frankel argued that during the first five-year plan Nehru directed 
policies towards the development of agriculture. He promoted rural 
government bodies based on universal suffrage, multipurpose co-
operative societies, and financial support for community self help 
organizations.  After the modest success of the first plan, faced with 
resource constraints, the government moved in the direction of rapid 
industrialisation.  But the low level of state investment in 
agriculture, the failure to implement land reforms, and the slow 
growth in productivity undermined the overall drive for 
industrialisation. Frankel here brilliantly brings forth the structural 
constraints built into India’s constitution in relation to agriculture.  
Agriculture remained a state subject and state governments were 
beholden towards landed elites who supplied resources and political 
muscle to the ruling party. According to Frankel, under Lal Bahadur 
Shastri the government of India increased investments in agriculture 
but concentrated on productivity. The power of the already feeble 
planning commission was trimmed and the government invited 
private capital to play a meaningful role in industrial expansion. 
Frankel here identifies two key factors in policy change. First, the 
World Bank pressured the Shastri government (1964-65) to initiate 
economic reforms for higher food grain production. Meanwhile 
state leaders persuaded the central leaders to abandon land reforms 
as a goal for agricultural development. Soon US President 
Johnson’s administration, using the leverage of American food aid, 
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further pushed India into abandoning institutional reform projects in 
favour of technical solutions to raise agricultural production. 
Francine’ work provides with the much needed international 
dimension as to why India’s redistributive development goals were 
abandoned. Of course recent researches further established that 
planners were not at all powerful under Nehru and that the Congress 
made historic compromises in 1948 by restraining labour and 
allowing conservative proprietary interests to dictate terms to the 
central government14. However, this process clearly was profoundly 
reinforced due to international pressures in the 1960s.  
 
Two subsequent works on political economy further provide us with 
a focus on rural society and the political economy of agricultural 
management. Ron Herring’s Land to the Tiller (1984), for example, 
provided us with a detailed explanation as to why certain types of 
policies were designed and the reasons for their lack of 
implementation. He focused his attention on land reform policies 
through an explanation of three different types of land reform: 
tenure reform policies, land ceiling based redistributive policies, and 
land to the tiller policies. Land reform in poor countries remained 
the corner stone of agricultural development with the aim of 
achieving both higher productivity and social justice. The latter 
provided regimes with political legitimacy in the eyes of the 
peasantry. According to Herring, land reforms failed because the 
existing social structures and state organisations remained captured 
by the landed elites and reproduced social inequity. He further 
explained this by highlighting the concept of the ‘embedded 
bureaucracy’. Bureaucrats, a privileged stratus in the society, were 
invariably tied to landed elites. Either they came from land-holding 
social classes or they themselves aspired to become landed elites as 
land-holding provided security and social status in a predominantly 
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agrarian society. Bureaucracy thus remained tied to land-holding 
elites through shared economic interests and social aspirations and 
sabotaged land reforms through corrupt practices. Like Atul Kohli, 
Herring argues that left of centre political parties can play a critical 
role in implementing redistributive reforms. In the case of Kerala 
the undivided CPI and later CPI (M) enacted the most radical land 
legislation that redefined the nature and formation of classes and 
direction of rural class conflicts. He thus claims that legal 
enactments effectively transformed both the interests and actions of 
social groups. This is an interesting claim but the fact remains that 
in most cases laws alone provided inadequate to the task of 
implementing land reform. Indeed, on the contrary, laws could 
become a radical force only when backed by democratising social 
movements headed by committed political parties. 
 
Another important thesis that implicitly sought to provide an 
alternative to   Bardhan, Frankel, Kohli and Ron Herring’s class-
based reading of rural politics was provided by Asutosh Varshney in 
Democracy, Development, and the Countryside: Urban-Rural 
Struggles in India (1995). Following Michael Lipton’s notion of 
urban bias in the development process, Varshney highlights the 
sectoral struggle between rural and urban India. He assumes a 
hypothetical unity in rural interests and proceeds to analyse it in 
terms of the rural-urban divide in Indian politics. Between chapter 2 
and chapter 5 he provides a history of India’s agricultural policies: 
the shift in the agricultural policies in India in the mid 60s, the 
growing government intervention in input and output markets, the 
birth and consolidation of the rural lobby, and the diverse types of 
party, non-party and bureaucratic forums that played a critical role 
in effecting agricultural policy change. Thus Varshney’s abiding 
concern was to explain why the rural sector did not become a 
predominant player in Indian politics. Following the famous 
assertion of Barrington Moore that democracies were established 
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through the obliteration of the peasantry he starts with the 
exceptional case of India’s rise as a peasant democracy. But he 
attributes the failure of the rural sectors to politicise itself to the 
urban bias of Marxist leaders like Nehru.  
 
The next section in Varshney’s study examines the rise of rural 
sectoral politics in India from the late 1970s. He claims that this was 
exceptional in the history of industrial transformation. He further 
argues that despite the large-scale mobilisation of rural interests, the 
rural sector did not achieve much in terms of economic gains. This 
he attributed to the divergence between economic and political 
interests.  Yet he claims that there did exist form some time a rural 
bias in India’s economic policies, which led to the rural sectoring 
gaining in terms of subsidies for farm output in a situation of 
production surpluses, relatively low taxation, and even the benefit 
of substantial loan remissions during the Janata Dal regime in 1990. 
More importantly, rural food prices did not fall despite an increase 
in government stocks of surplus food grains. This obviously implied 
that through government food subsidies the richer segments 
amongst rural producers could resist falling prices and gain at the 
expense of poor rural workers (amounting to some 60% of rural 
society) who depended on the market for access to food products.  
 
The problem with Varshney’s thesis is his construction of the notion 
of a single, unitary rural sector. The rural sector has always been 
divided in terms of class, caste, region and religion. Varshney’s 
final chapter pays inadequate attention to this. Indeed, to avoid the 
inevitable reality of class, caste, and regional fault lines in rural 
society, which constituted a fundamental axis to Indian politics, 
Varshney posits an entirely imagined reality of unified rural 
interests to simplify the task of analysis. He further omits to explain 
what constitutes urban interests and urban interest groups in India.  
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Conclusion 
 
This survey of classics in political science literature on India 
between the late 1950s and late 1990s establishes a clear pattern in 
the range of approaches used by political scientists to understand 
Indian politics. Political scientists have used ready-made theoretical 
lenses to understand Indian society. Politics they often presumed 
was based upon the single institutional edifice of society. Instead of 
viewing institutions as deeply embedded within Indian social 
structures, institutions were provided with a life of their own and 
were attributed with the ability to change society. Except for the 
writings of a few scholars, who use neo-Marxist templates, societal 
contradictions were presumed to be emanating entirely from state 
policies. When the modernisation of society through political 
institutions increasingly appeared to be untenable, political 
scientists sought to view India through paradoxes and even 
constructed homogenous social entities such as ‘the rural interest’, 
in defiance of the evidence from empirical reality. India thus had to 
be invented and reinvented as diverse forms of political movements 
contesting for political power, with political formations emerging in 
one historical conjecture and then dissolving in the next when faced 
with the social contradictions that brought them into existence in the 
first place.  
 
The fluidity perceived by political scientists is expressed in terms of 
the complexity of Indian society and its multiple forms of transition 
over nearly six decades under the impact of global, local, social, 
economic and cultural forces. It would certainly be mistaken to 
argue that there is a unidirectional flow in terms of societal change 
in India. Democracy in a predominantly agrarian society will be 
marked by resource constraints that generate diverse societal 
responses and can be shaped by these societal responses in a way 
that might not fit into existing theoretical lenses. But rather than 
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using ready-made theoretical constructs, it should be possible 
instead to explore Indian politics in terms of the social analysis of 
the historical unfolding of events. Theories could then be used to 
interrogate historical processes and historical evidence could be 
used to interrogate theories.    
 
National security is a key term often referenced, but poorly defined, 
in many theoretical constructions of the Indian polity. It would 
arguably be better to redeploy the term to understand societal 
security. The processes that lead to the creation of a socially just, 
politically inclusive, and culturally tolerant society can only be 
understood through a nuanced historical interpretation of social 
changes within a temporal framework. Humans operate within 
structural constraints but they also impose their imprints on 
structures. The security desired by individuals needs to be 
understood in terms of their agency to engage with historically 
given structural constrains and their ability to transcend them. 
Dominance and hegemony, furthermore, cannot be understood 
without an examination of subaltern resistance and its imprints upon 
society as whole. A dialogue between historians and political 
scientists, through the medium of contemporary history, could 
potentially therefore provide a superior instrument with which to 
understand the ability of citizens to mitigate and transform society 
and the politics that represents it. 
 
The historian Ramachandra Guha has remarked that historians have 
a preference for writing about the colonial era, since this was a time 
when events within even the most isolated rural setting could easily 
be seen to be connected to global events and grand historical 
arguments about the development of colonialism, capitalism, and 
the national movement. The history of politics post-1947 is by 
contrast, at least until the era of globalisation takes off in the 
twenty-first century, an apparently more parochial affair. It may be 
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argued, however, that this appearance is merely a consequence of 
the way in which post-independence politics has been represented in 
the writings of functionalist political analysts. By abandoning the 
study of politics in the late twentieth century through preference, 
and by citing the difficulties of writing history without access to the 
usual form of archival sources, historians have evaded the need for 
methodological innovation that have been more squarely faced by 
the social sciences. The time has now come for historians to face up 
to the challenge of interpreting the last half-century of Indian 
history with the same acuity and depth that they have explored the 
colonial era. This would be a great service not only to history, but 
also to the field of South Asian studies as a whole. 
 
*** 
